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CASE COMMENTS
ELECTIONS - DENIAL OF REDUCED POSTAL RATES To
MINOR AND NEw POLITICAL PARTIES CONSTITUTES A
VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
Plaintiff political parties were denied special reduced rates for
bulk third class mailings that were available to the Democratic and
Republican Parties pursuant to the eligibility requirements of the
Postal Service Appropriation Act.1 Plaintiff parties sought an
injunction invalidating as unconstitutional the relevant portion of
the Postal Service Appropriation Act 2 or, alternatively, directing
that they be afforded the special reduced rates.3 As a consequence
of the Postal Act's provisions, the two major parties paid only 3.1
cents per letter, while all other parties paid 8.4 cents.4 The plaintiff
1. Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 F. Supp. 756, 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The plaintiffs in this action
were the Socialist Party of America, the Libertarian Party, the Peace and Freedom Party, the
Conservative Party of the State of New York, the Citizens' Party and the National Unity Campaign
forJohn Anderson and Uriel P. Bauer. Id. at 766-68. These parties historically have promulgated
unpopular and minority views to society. For example, the Socialist Party of America, founded in
1901, believes it is essential to have some form of economic as well as political democracy. The
democratic decision-making process, in the Socialists' view, should extend to other areas of society
and not be limited to participation in the governing process. Id. at 766. The Libertarian Party,
founded in 1971, professes that each individual has the absolute right to exercise sole dominion over
his or her own life, liberty, and property, so long as the individual respects the equal right of every
other individual to do the same. Id. Like the Libertarian Party, the other plaintiff political parties
also represent unorthodox positions.
2. Postal Service Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, tit. II, 93 Stat. 562 (1979). The
relevant portion of the Act provides that "no funds appropriated herein shall be available for
implementing special bulk third-class rates for 'qualified political committees' authorized by Public
Law 95-593, other than the National, State, or congressional committee of a major or minor party as
defined in Public Law 92-178, as amended." Id. Pursuant to this Act, the Governors of the Postal
Service adopted a resolution that effectively limited the preferred rate for bulk third class mailings to
the major parties. Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 F. Supp. at 766. As a result, the plaintiff political parties
were informed that they would no longer be entitled to the special rate of 3.1 cents per letter, and
instead would be required to pay 8.4 cents for each mailing. Id.
3. Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 F. Supp. at 764.
4. Id. Prior to the 1980 Postal Service Appropriation Act, supra note 2, the plaintiff political
parties enjoyed reduced third class bulk mail rates. Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 F. Supp. at 765. This
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parties alleged that the eligibility requirements for the reduced rates
violated their rights under the due process clause, the equal
protection clause, and the first amendment.5 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York recognized the
state's interest in ensuring the manageability and integrity of
elections, but found that the minority political parties must be
afforded the right of equal access to the marketplace of political
ideas. 6 Thus, the court held that minor and new political parties
have a right to enjoy special reduced mailing rates equal to that
enjoyed by the two major parties. Therefore, the Postal Service
Appropriation Act was unconstitutional.7 Greenberg v. Bolger, 497
F. Supp. 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
Equal access to political ideas and the opportunity to influence
governmental policy through elections are essential rights in a
democratic society. 8 Third parties and independent candidates
traditionally have been effective sources of novel and unorthodox
political and social views and have played a vital role in changing
the political environment. 9 Although courts have recognized the
vital role played by minor parties, third parties, and independent
candidates, historically these parties have not enjoyed the same
level of constitutional protection that has been afforded the
Democratic and Republican Parties.' 0 State election committees
traditionally have employed several practices which effectively
work to exclude third parties and independent candidates from a
position on election ballots."
preferred rate enabled plaintiffs to increase substantially the frequency and volume of their mailings.
Id. For example, the Free Libertarian Party was able to increase its mailings from approximately 700
pieces per month to as many as 2000 per month. Id.
5. Id. at 773, 774, 778. The plaintiffs argued that they were deprived of due process of law
because appropriation provisions were used to alter existing law, in violation of House of
Representatives Rule XXI (2). The court rejected this argument, declaring that "[d]ue process
rights to be heard do not attach to procedures resulting in the enactment of generally applicable
legislation." Id. at 774.
6. 497 F. Supp. at 764.
7. Id. at 775, 781.
8. Id. at 764.
9. Id. at 771. Although third parties historically have not received broad support from the
electorate, they do play an important role in American politics. Third parties formulate and develop
policies before major parties are ready to act, they help modify major policies to reflect the view of an
emerging third party, and they often test new programs that eventually prove unworkable or
unpopular. Id.
10. Id.
11. See 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 155 (1975). Because these state committees charged
with overseeing elections are generally comprised of members of the two major parties, election
regulation practices that keep a candidate off the election ballot are rarely scrutinized until
litigation is commenced. For example, in Pirincin v. Board of Elections, 368 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Ohio
1973), aff'dmem., 414 U.S. 990 (1973), Ohio's scheme for selection of members of the county boards
of election, providing that the secretary of state appoint four qualified electors of the county to serve
for a term of four years, consisted solely of Democratic and Republican Party members. The district
court's decision, affirmed by the Supreme Court, held that the scheme did not impinge upon the
right to vote and did not deprive independent or minority candidates of due process by effectively
shutting them out of the decisionmaking process. 368 F. Supp. at 80.
480
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For example, a number of states had enacted statutes that
disqualified defeated primary candidates from being candidates in
the general election, effectively excluding third party and
independent candidates from the ballot.1 2 North Dakota was one
such state. Its statute provided that any person defeated in the
primary election was prohibited from being a candidate for the
same office in the ensuing general election. 13 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held this statute unconstitutional in Ex rel Graham v.
Hall, 14 because the statute had the effect of adding a qualification
for holding public office to those already prescribed by the state
constitution. 5 The court reasoned that the statute interfered not
only with the person's right to become a candidate, but also with
the electors' interest in choosing public officials, thereby interfering
with the citizens' free exercise of their elective franchise.' 6 The
court concluded that because the legislature may not deter,
hamper, or interfere with a person's right to become a candidate or
with the citizens' choice of public officials, the statute was
unconstitutional. 
17
Another state practice which effectively restricted ballot access
was the requirement that nonmajor party and independent
candidates pay excessive filing fees as a condition to having their
names placed on the ballot.' 8 Such mandatory filing fees were held
Several problems arising in election law litigation that serve as barriers to potential litigants
include: 1) Difficulties in satisfying standing requirements (A personal stake in the outcome is
required, as well as an assertion of an individual's own legal rights.); 2) the political question,
doctrine (Political questions are not subject to judicial review as their resolution is delegated to
another branch of government.); 3) problems with mootness (Theoretically, a controversy no longer
exists and thus, good adjudication of the case would not result.); and 4) difficulties in determining
appropriate remedies (A judicial order requiring that the government spend funds arguably amounts
to making appropriations, a power reserved for Congress.) L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw. 3-34, 3-16, 3-22 (1st ed. 1978).
12. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE S 141 (1939). The statute provided as follows:
Be it Enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the State of North Dakota:
5 1. That any person who was a candidate for nomination for office at any
primary election in any year and who was defeated for said office shall not be eligible
as a candidate for the same office at the ensuing general election.
Id. See Ex rel Graham v. Hall, 73 N.D. 428, 15 N.W.2d 736 (1944) (holding statute unconstitutional).
13. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 141 (1939) (repealed 1945) held unconstitutional in Ex r" Graham v. Hall,
73 N.D. 428, 15 N.W.2d 736 (1944).
14. ExrelGraham v. Hall, 73 N.D. 428, 15 N.W.2d 736 (1944).
15. Id. at 437, 15 N.W.2d at 741. The North Dakota Constitution provided:
No person shall be eligible to the office of governor or lieutenant governor unless
he be a citizen of the United States, and a qualified elector of the state, who shall have
attained the age of thirty years, and who shall have resided five years next preceding
the election within the state or territory, nor shall he be eligible to any other office
during the term for which he shall have been elected.
N.D. CONST. art. III S 73 (currently codified at N.D. CONST. art. V § 3).
16. 73 N.D. at 433, 15 N.W.2d at 739.
17. Id. at 437, 15 N.W.2d at 741.
18. See, e.g., TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 13.08a (Vernon 1967).
Art. 13.08a provided the following for filing fees:
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unconstitutional in Bullock v. Carter, 19 which involved a challenge to
the Texas filing fee statute for candidates seeking ballot positions in
primary elections. Fee payments as high as $8,900 were invalidated
on the ground that they burdened voting rights and that the burden
resulted from wealth distinctions.20 The court found that the filing
fee system favored affluent voters over poor voters in the ballot
formation process, since candidates favored by affluent voters could
pay the fee more easily than candidates supported by poor voters. 21
The court in Bullock held that this distinction was impermissibly
based upon wealth and, therefore, violated the equal protection
clause. 22 Thus, statutes that required payment of excessive filing
fees were unconstitutional. 23
Candidates were also sometimes required to take a loyalty oath
as a condition to having their names placed on the ballot. 24 These
oaths involved a vow that the candidate did not advocate the violent
overthrow of local, state, or national government. 25 The oaths were
held unconstitutional in Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 26 in which the
court addressed the issue of loyalty oaths that effectively penalized
candidates for expression of their beliefs by excluding them from
the ballot. 27  The Whitcomb court found that the loyalty oath
Population of County Filing Fee
Less than 650,000 ............................................. $150.00
650,000 to 900,000 ............................................. 600.00
900,000 to 1,000,000 ........................................... 300.00
1,000,000 or m ore ............................................. 500.00
Id.
19. 405 U.S. 134 (1972). In Bullock persons seeking to become candidates for local office in the
Texas Democratic primary election challenged the constitutionality of the Texas.filing fee scheme on
the ground that the statutory scheme violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 141.
20. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
21. Id. at 144.
22. Id. at 145.
23. Id. at 149. The State's contention that the filing fees were necessary to regulate the primary
ballot and to finance elections was rejected by the Court's holding that excessive filing fees violated
the equal protection clause. Id. at 145.
24. Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974).
25. 414 U.S. at 443. The Indiana loyalty oath statute, which was found unconstitutional in
Whitcomb, required that "fnio existing or newly-organized political party or organization shall be
permitted on or to have the names of its candidates printed on the ballot used at any election until it
has filed an affidavit, by its officers, under oath, that it does not advocate the overthrow of local,
state, or national government by force or violence .... " IND. ANN. STAT. S 29-3812 (Burns 1969).
The current version of Indiana's loyalty oath statute is codified at INo. ANN. STAT. S 3-1-11-12
(Burns 1972).
26. 414 U.S. 441 (1974).
27. 414 U.S. at 441-43. The Communist Party had been barred from the 1972 Indiana general
election ballot because it had not filed the proper affidavit disavowing its belief in the violent
overthrow of local, state, or national government. Id. at 443-45. Instead, the Party filed an affidavit
to which it attached its own definition of advocacy, which the Indiana Election Board rejected. Id. at
444. In striking down the loyalty oath requirement, the court ruled on the constitutional principle
stated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), that the first amendment guarantees of free
speech and free press do "not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such an action." Id. at 447. The Indiana oath included
advocacy of an abstract doctrine as well as advocacy of unlawful action and thus contravened this
first amendment principle. Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. at 447. The Brandenbur. Court
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penalized candidates for protected expression, and the oath was
struck down as an unconstitutional infringement on protected
speech. 28
Constitutional attacks on legislation that effectively
discriminates against nonmajor parties have not been limited
solely to state laws. The Federal Election Campaign Act's
29
(FECA) provisions regarding contribution limitations, disclosure
requirements, and presidential campaign funding have been
challenged as discriminatory against nonmajor parties. 3 0 In Buckley
v. Valeo31  the FECA was challenged on the grounds that
contribution limitations unjustifiably burdened first amendment
freedoms and discriminated against minor parties and independent
candidates in violation of the fifth amendment. 32 The FECA limits
individual contributions to candidates for federal office to $1,000
for any single candidate, with a maximum total for all such
contributions of $25,000 per year. 3" The Buckley Court found that
the limitations on individual contributions to political candidates
were within the FECA's primary purpose of limiting the actuality
or appearance of corruption resulting from large campaign
contributions. 34 The Buckley Court concluded that the important
interests served by restricting the amount of financial contributions
were sufficient to justify the limited infringement upon first
amendment rights resulting from the $1,000 and $25,000
contribution ceilings. 35 The Buckley Court also rejected the
argument that contribution limitations invidiously discriminate
rejected the use of the clear and present danger test, which focused on the likelihood of possible harm
arising from proscribed expression, for evaluation of the constitutionality of statutes. Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. at 447. Thus, the test for determining when speech can be constitutionally restricted
shifted from examination of the consequences of expression to the content of the speech. Communist
Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. at 448. If the speech does not direct advocacy of unlawful action, it
cannot be constitutionally forbidden. Id. Because the Indiana statute included both advocacy and
incitement, it was held unconstitutional. Id. at 446-47.
28. 414 U.S. at 449-50. The Whitcomb Court found that the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press, which prohibit a state from criminalizing speech that is not directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action or likely to produce such action, could not be applied to cases
of state regulation of access to the ballot. The Court further rejected the notion that any group that
advocates violent overthrow as an abstract doctrine must be regarded as necessarily advocating
unlawful action. Id. at 450.
29. 2 U.S.C.A. SS 431-435 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980) (originally enacted as Fed. Election
Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, S 301, 86 Stat. 11).
30. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley v. Valeo, a seminal case in election law, has received much
attention in legal periodicals. E.g., Note, The Unconstitutionality of Limitations on Contributions to Political
Committees in the 1975 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, 86 YALE L.J. 953 (1977); The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REV. 56, 171-96 (1976); 25 EMORY L... 400 (1976).
32. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11 (1976).
33. Id. at 13. The Court was referring to title 18 U.S.C., sections 608(b)(1) and (3) during its
discussion of contribution limitations. 2 U.S.C.A. S 441a (West 1977 & Supp. 1981) (current
codification of title 18 U.S.C., sections 608(b)( 1) and (3)).
34. 424 U.S. at 38.
35. Id. at 29, 38.
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against minor parties and independent candidates.36 Although the
Court addressed this "troubling" charge of discrimination, it
concluded that the limitations actually benefit nonmajor parties.
3"
The Court reasoned that, because major parties receive more
money in large contributions, limitations on these contributions
would facilitate fund raising by the nonmajor parties.3 8 Thus, the
Court found no invidious discrimination in violation of the fifth
amendment. 39 Therefore, the contribution limitations of the FECA
were constitutional. 40
The Buckley Court also discussed the disclosure provisions of
the FECA. These provisions require political committees to keep
detailed records of their contributions and expenditures. 4 1 These
particular FECA requirements were attacked in Buckley as being
overbroad when applied to minor parties and independent
candidates. 42 The nonmajor, parties alleged that disclosure would
deter individuals from contributing to minor parties and
independent candidates because of the novel and unorthodox views
presented by such candidates. 43 The Buckley Court acknowledged
that some contributors may be exposed to "harassment or
retaliation," but concluded that the governmental interests of
providing information on candidates to voters and of deterring
corruption or the appearance of corruption were sufficiently
important to outweigh this burden. 44 The Buckley Court did
recognize that the need for disclosure was diminished when
contributions are made to minor parties with little chance of
winning the election,4 5 but refused to create an exception for minor
parties and independent candidates. 46  Thus, the disclosure
provisions were constitutional. 7
The final challenge by the nonmajor parties in Buckley was
36. Id. at 33.
37. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States found that "[t]he charge of discrimination
against minor-party and independent candidates is more troubling, but the record provides no basis
for concluding that the Act [FECA] invidiously disadvantages such candidates." Id. The Buckley
Court further noted that the FECA "on its face treats all candidates equally with regard to
contribution limitations." Id.
38. Id. at 33-35.
39. Id. at 35.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 82-84. The FECA requires that the disclosure records include the name and address of
each individual contributing in excess of$10, and his occupation and principal place of business if his
contribution exceeds $100. Id. at 82. The FECA also requires the political committee to disclose the
recipient and purpose of every expenditure over $100. Id.
42. Id. at 61.
43. Id. at 68.
44. Id. The Buckley Court noted that the disclosure requirements appeared to be the "least
restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to
exist." Id.
45. Id. at 66-67.
46. Id. at 70,
47. Id. at 74.
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aimed at the FECA's establishment of a public financing scheme
for presidential election campaigns.48 The scheme provides that
"major" parties receive full funding for presidential campaigns,
while "minor" parties receive only a percentage of the funds to
which the major parties are entitled.4 9 "New" parties are limited to
receipt of post-election funds or are not entitled to any funds if their
candidate receives less than five percent of the vote.
50
The nonmajor parties challenged this public financing plan as
unconstitutionally discriminatory. The Court found that the plan
violated the fifth amendment, especially when applied to "new"
political parties.5 1 The challengers asserted that requiring a "new"
party to fund its own campaign in hopes of receiving post-election
reimbursement was an unconstitutional burden on the new party.
52
The Buckley Court dismissed this argument, holding that the
government interests of "not funding hopeless candidates with
large sums of public money" and not "providing artificial
incentives to 'splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism' "5
were well served by the public funding scheme.54 Thus, acceptance
of public funds would narrow the economic gap that existed
between the major and minor parties.
55
The action brought in Greenberg to contest the constitutionality
of the 1980 Postal Service Appropriation Act involved challenges
similar to those in Buckley. The postal service is one of the most
effective mediums of communication available for the
dissemination of political information. 56 It operates as a monopoly
because federal law prohibits the establishment of a private postal
system. 57 As the sole provider, the United States Postal Service is
48. Id. at 85.
49. 26 U.S.C. S 9004(a)(1) (Supp. I 1970) (currently codified at 26 U.S.C.A. S 9004 (West
Supp. 1981)). To defray expenses in the general election campaign, major-party candidates are
entitled to $20,000,000. To be eligible for these funds, the candidate must pledge not to incur
expenses in excess of this amount, and not to accept private contributions unless the funding is
insufficient to provide the full $20,000,000. Minor-party candidates are entitled to funding based on
the ratio of the vote received by the party's candidate in the preceding election to the average of the
major-party candidates. New-party candidates receive no funding prior to the general election, but
any candidate who receives five percent or more of the popular vote in the election is entitled to post-
election payments according to the same ratio applicable to minor-party candidates. Id.
50. 1d.
51. 424 U.S. at 102.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 96 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 103-04.
55. Id
56. See generally 1 DOLLAR POLITICS, THE ISSUES OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING (1971). Candidates
commonly depend on various types of print media, including posters, billboards, brochures,
newspaper and magazine advertisements, handbills, buttons, and bumper strips, as well as the
electronic media, throughout the course of their campaigns. Id. The Greenberg court recognized the
importance of access to the mails, quoting Mr. Justice Holmes: " T]he use of the mails is almost as
much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues .... " Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 F. Supp. at
774 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting United States ex rel Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes,J., dissenting)).
57. 18 U.S.C. S 1696 (1970) (also codified at 18 U.S.C.A. S 1696 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981)).
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required to deliver its services fairly and is forbidden to
discriminate by serving some more favorably than others. 58 The
Governors of the Postal Service are charged with the establishment
of fair and equitable classes of mail, postage rates, and fees.
59
Notwithstanding that requirement, the Postal Reorganization Act
of 1970 authorized Congress to provide for subsidization of postal
rates, which allowed some recipients to enjoy lower postal rates.
60
These special reduced mailing rates were later extended to
"qualified political committees" in the Overseas Citizens Voting
Rights Act Amendments. 61 Qualified political committees were
defined to include "a national or state committee of a political
party," and as a result, all political parties were afforded reduced
bulk mailing rates. 62 This special rate enabled third parties to
substantially increase the frequency and volume of their mailings. 
63
The 1980 Postal Service Appropriation Act, however, contained a
more restrictive definition of the category of political organizations
that would be eligible for the special mailing rate. 64 An eligible
organization was defined as the national, state, or congressional
committee of a major or minor party. 65 This effectively limited the
special mailing rate to the two dominant political parties, the
Democrats and the Republicans; they alone could meet the
eligibility requirements. 66 The cost of mailing was thus sharply
increased for all other parties, and the ability to disseminate
political information was thereby restricted. The affected political
parties challenged the constitutionality of the 1980 Act in Greenberg
v. Bolger, alleging that the eligibility requirements for the reduced
rates violated their rights under the first amendment and the equal
58. Id.
59. Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C. S 3621 (1970) (currently codified at 39
U.S.C.A. 3621 (West 1980)).
60. Id.
61. Pub. L. No. 95-593, S 11(c), 92 Stat. 2535 (1978).
62. See Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 F. Supp. at 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting 39 U.S.C.
S 3626(e)(1) & (2)(1970)).
63. Id. For example, the Free Libertarian Party was able to increase its mailings from
approximately 700 pieces per month to as many as 2000 per month. Id.
64. Postal Service Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, tit. I, 93 Stat. 562 (1979).
The 1980 Act contained a more narrow definition of eligible political organizations. It provides, in
pertinent part, that "no funds appropriated . . . shall be available for implementing special bulk
third class rates for 'qualified political committees' authorized by Public Law 95-593 1978 Act, other
than the National, State, or congressional committee of a major or minor party as defined in Public
Law 92-178." Id.
Public Law 92-178, entitled the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, defines a "major"
party as "a political party whose candidate for the office of President in the preceding presidential
election received, as a candidate for such party, 25 percent or more of the total number of votes
received by all candidates for such office." Presidential Election Campaign Act, 26 U.S.C. S 9002(6)
(1970). A "minor" party is defined as one "whose last presidential candidate received more than 5
percent but less than 25 percent of the total popular vote." 26 U.S.C. S 9002 (7) (1970). A "new"
party is one "whose candidate received less than 5 percent of the vote." 26 U.S.C. 5 9002 (8) (1970).
65. Postal Service Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, tit. II, 93 Stat. 562 (1979).
66. 497 F. Supp. at 765-66.
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protection clause. 67
In Greenberg the court first addressed the issue of whether the
postal subsidy scheme violated the plaintiff's first amendment
rights of freedom of expression and association.6 8 The court noted
that government regulations that affect the first amendment
guarantee to freedom of speech must be content neutral. 69 The
political positions of the plaintiffs, the Greenberg court noted, were
substantially different from those of the major parties. 70 Therefore,
the court reasoned that by subsidizing the mailings of only the
Republicans and Democrats, Congress had, in effect, conferred
benefits upon those with popular views while burdening those with
unpopular ones. 71 The court found that denying special mailing
rates to political parties because they had not achieved a required
level of acceptance had the same effect as overtly censoring speech
because of its substance. 72 The court then concluded that the 1980
Act was an unconstitutional restriction on the first amendment
rights of nonmajor parties. 
73
The Greenberg court also concluded that the 1980 Act violated
the plaintiff political parties' equal protection rights. 74  To
determine the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied, the court first
searched for an infringment of a fundamental right.75 The court
found that the plaintiffs' first amendment freedoms had been
infringed.7 6 The court reasoned that the denial of preferred mailing
67. Id. at 773-74. The plaintiffs argued that they were deprived of due process of law because the
1980 Act violated House of Representatives Rule XXI (2) which prohibits the use of appropriations
provisions to alter existing law. The Greenberg court rejected this claim, stating that "[djue process
rights to be heard do not attach to procedures resulting in the enactment of generally-applicable
legislation." Id. at 773.
68. Id. at 774. The rights of expression and association originate in the first amendment which
provides: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69. 497 F. Supp. at 774. Content-neutral regulation of expression means that "the government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content." Id. at 774 (citing Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 95 (1972)).
70. 497 F. Supp. at 776. The Socialist Party of America contends that the democratic decision-
making process should regulate other aspects of life, rather than simply control the political
democracy. Id. at 766. The Libertarian Party, however, believes that each individual has the
absolute right to exercise sole dominion over his or her life, liberty, and property so long as he or she
respects the equal right of every other individual to do the same. Id.
71. Id. at 776.
72. Id. The Greenberg court further reasoned that the' denial of the postal discount unduly
burdened first amendment liberties because such a denial generated costs which were directly
proportionate to the number of persons the speaker sought to reach. Id.
73. Id. at 778.
74. Id. The fourteenth amendment provides: "No state shall . .. deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1. The due process clause
of the fifth amendment subjects the federal government to the same restriction. U.S. CONST. amend
V.
75. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §5 16-2 to -5 (1st ed.
1978). The court must first determine whether a suspect class or fundamental right is affected by the
legislative scheme. If such a class or right is affected, the legislation will be reviewed with strict
scrutiny. If such a class or right is not involved, the provision need be only rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose to withstand constitutional attack. Id.
76. 497 F. Supp. at 778.
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rates directly limits the plaintiffs' access to the mails. 7" The
increased cost of mailing restricted the plaintiff parties' ability to
use the mails, affording them fewer opportunities to spread their
political message. 78 Therefore, the Greenberg court concluded that
the plaintiffs' ability to express their political views was seriously
impaired, thus jeopardizing their first amendment right of
expression. 79 The court found that the plaintiff parties' ability to
procure new members was also seriously impaired because the
higher mailing costs restricted the parties' ability to reach
prospective members.8 0 The court reasoned that this restriction
violated the plaintiffs' fundamental first amendment right to
freedom of association."'
Legislation affecting a fundmental right must undergo "strict
scrutiny," which requires a demonstration that the law is necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest and that there is no
less burdensome method of accomplishing the intended purpose.
8 2
The defendants contended that the eligibility requirements for the
postal rate discount operate to facilitate public expression, ensure a
manageable election process, preserve scarce public resources, and
protect against factionalism.8" The court found that these interests,
while legitimate goals, were not compelling governmental interests
that would justify interference with the first amendment right of
expression and association. 
8 4
In reaching its conclusion, the Greenberg court noted that the
1980 Act imposes a higher postal rate on third parties and
independent candidates, those who are most in need of an
economical means of access to the voting public. 85 Thus, the court
77. Id.
78. Id. at 765. Congressional debate indicates that legislators were fully aware of the negative
effect the 1980 Act would have on minor and third parties. One representative observed that the
amendment would "sharply restrict minority parties' access to the mails." 125 CoNo. REc. 5888
(1979) (remarks of Representative Glickman). Despite the negative observations of several
representatives, the 1980 Act was adopted. 1980 Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-74, tit. II, 92
Stat. 562 (1979). See 497 F. Supp. at 765.
79. 497 F. Supp. at 778.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 779. The court stated that "[i]nterference with a political party's utilization of the
mails is a direct infringement on the ability of that party to express its views which is, in turn,
interference with the ability of members and potential members to enjoy political associations of their
choosing." Id.
82. Id. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 16-2 to -5 (1st ed. 1978).
83. 497 F. Supp. at 779-81.
84. Id. at 781. The court found that the interests purportedly protected by the 1980 Act did not
survive impartial scrutiny, adding that "[any standard that causes funds to be allocated to some
candidates or parties and not to others is inherently suspect because it serves the self-interests of those
responsible for establishing the standard." Id. See generally 88 HARV. L. REv. 1111 (1975).
85. 497 F. Supp. at 778. The Greenberg court noted that "the integral role played by mailings,
and the extremely tight budgetary constraints under which most third and independent parties
operate all mitigate against the proposition that the government could facilitate access for one
political party and not necessarily burden all other parties that are in competition with the benefited
party." Id.
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reasoned that the effect of the 1980 Act is not to facilitate political
communication but to suppress it.86 The court concluded that
restricting access "to the minds of the public in and for itself" is not
an acceptable goal of government regulation, rendering the 1980
Act unconstitutional. 
87
The putative governmental interest in preserving the integrity
of elections was similarly rejected by the court as a compelling
governmental interest. The court noted that the government may
legitimately prescribe qualifications for access to the ballot in order
to minimize confusion and to obtain a fair picture of the wishes o
the electorate.8 8 The court found, however, that restricting access
to the mails to ensure manageability and integrity of elections does
not preserve, but rather challenges, the integrity of the political
process. 89 The court concluded that since the first amendment's
purpose is to preserve the free exchange of ideas, any regulation
that prevents access to the potential voter contravenes that
amendment. 90
The government's interest in protecting scarce fiscal resources
was summarily rejected by the Greenberg court. All cases in which
the government protects and fosters free expression by providing a
public forum involve the expenditure of scarce financial
resources. 91 Because of this, the Greenberg court found that if funds
used to subsidize political mailing are limited, the amount of
subsidy received by the two major parties can readily be reduced so
that all political mailings are charged equally. 92 Thus, the court
concluded that financial limitations may not be used to prevent full
equality between the two major parties and the minor political
parties. 9s
Protection against factionalism, the final interest advanced by
the government, previously has received a qualified sanction by the
Supreme Court. 94 The Greenberg court, however, found that there
has been no indication that stifling the speech of competitors, which
86. Id. at 780.
87. Id.
88. Id. Regulations designed to ensure that an independent or third party candidate is a
"serious contender, truly independent, and with a satisfactory level of community support"
generally withstand constitutional attack. Id. (citing Storer v. Brown, 417 U.S. 724, 746 (1974)
(footnote omitted)).
89. 497 F. Supp. at 780.
90. Id.
91. Id. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-21, at 689-90 (st ed. 1978). The
public fora "cannot be put off limits to leafletting, parading, or other first amendment activities
merely to spare public expense or inconvenience. Id.
92. 497 F. Supp. at 781.
93. Id.
94. Id. The interest in minimizing the threat of factionalism has received support in recent
United States Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974)
(campaign funding case); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1976) (campaign funding case).
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results in the entrenchment of the two party system, is a legitimate
governmental interest. 95 It concluded that, while Congress may
choose not to offer assistance to new parties or independent
candidates, it may not act to create disincentives for the purpose of
protecting the two parties currently controlling the government.
96
In arriving at its decision, the Greenberg court carefully
distinguished its rationale for striking down the postal provision
from that upholding the public financing provisions in Buckley v.
Valeo. 97 In Buckley the specific challenge related to the contribution
and expenditure limitations that the Federal Election Campaign
Act placed upon individuals and candidates. 98 The Buckley court
found that the limitations on individual contributions to political
candidates and authorized campaign committees were within the
Act's primary purpose of limiting the actuality and appearance of
corruption resulting from large contributions. 99 Although the court
upheld the limitation on individual campaign expenditures, it
found that .ceilings on expenditures by candidates imposed direct
and substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech. 100 The
Federal Election Campaign Act requires those accepting public
financing to voluntarily accept expenditure ceilings, thereby
eliminating any suggestion that the major party's ability to
campaign is enhanced by the Act. 101
In contrast, under the 1980 Postal Act, the receipt of the
discounted postal rate by political parties was not conditioned upon
a relinquishment of private funds. 102 Thus, the Greenberg court
found that receiving the postal discount could not act to the
advantage of those parties that did not qualify for the rates.
10 3
Receipt of the postal discount, however, greatly enhanced the
ability of qualifying parties to campaign, while substantially
reducing the ability of non-qualifying parties. 104 Thus, the court
found that the 1980 Act exacerbated the very problem of party
wealth impact on elections that the FECA sought to relieve.
10 5
95. 497 F. Supp. at 781.
96. Id.
97. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
98. Id. at 38. The FECA limited individual contributions to candidates for federal office to
$1,000 for any single candidate and limited expenditures of political candidates to $1,000 per
candidate per election. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 39.
101. 497 F. Supp. at 780. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
102. 497 F. Supp. at 780.
103. Id. The Buckley Court suggested that expenditure limits for the two major parties might
actually improve the chances of minor and third parties to receive funds and increase their spending.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 101.
104. 497 F. Supp. at 780.
105. Id.
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Therefore, the court concluded that unlike the FECA, the 1980 Act
could not withstand constitutional attack. 106
The Greenberg court recognized the vital role played by minor
parties and independent candidates in changing the political
environment. 107 The court held that these parties must be afforded
equal access to the marketplace of political ideas to bring about
change effectively. 108 The postal scheme was held unconstitutional
in Greenberg because it abridged this first amendment right. 109 The
Buckley Court, however, refused to recognize the important first
amendment role of nonmajor parties in enriching the marketplace
of ideas. 110 Unlike Greenberg, the Buckley Court failed to focus upon
the legislation's practical effect of inhibiting an important function
of nonmajor parties - to subject new and unorthodox positions to
public scrutiny.111 Thus, the Greenberg decision indicates that
perhaps courts are now willing to adopt a different focus towards
nonmajor parties.
Because Buckey and Greenberg were similar cases yet reached
different conclusions, the result in Greenberg may signify a trend
towards focusing on the discriminatory treatment of nonmajor
parties. Even though both Buckley and Greenberg involved funding
with taxpayer money, nonmajor parties were treated differently
from major parties. Contrary to Buckley, Greenberg found this
different treatment to be unconstitutional. 112
In Buckley the Presidential Campaign Fund was financed by
individual taxpayers who "checked off" one dollar of their tax"
liability to the campaign fund.113 In Greenberg the taxpayer funded
the postage discount scheme through congressional appropriations
to the Postal Service. 114 The Buckley Court, however, refused to
concede that the treatment was unconstitutional. In Buckley,
contribution limitiations, disclosure requirements, and public
funding were challenged as discriminating against nonmajor
106. Id. at 779. The Greenberg court concluded that the "[h]arm caused by the 1980 Act [was]'
substantial and clear." Id.
107. Id. at 764.
108. Id. The Greenberg court viewed its duty as "protect[ing] a minority against a majority's
attempt to reduce human rights." Id.
109. Id. at 778.
110. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 100-01 (1976).
111. See Nicholson, Buckley o. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendnents of1974, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 323, 363 (1977).
112. 497 F. Supp. at 778.
113. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 86 (1976). Tax payers filing a joint return may authorize a
two dollar payment to the presidential campaign fund. The presidential campaign fund consists of
three separate accounts to finance party nominating conventions, general election campaigns, and
primary campaigns. Id.
114. 497 F. Supp. at 765.
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parties, 115 but the Court upheld these provisions."16 The postal
scheme in Greenberg was similarly challenged, but in that case the
provision was found to be unconstitutional. "7
In both Buckley and Greenberg, minor parties and independent
candidates sought treatment equal to that afforded the major
parties. Nonmajor parties were seeking to share in pre-election
financing with the major political parties in Buckley. 18 In Greenberg,
the plaintiff parties sought a decrease in postal rates for minor
parties and independent candidates. 119 The plaintiff parties were
granted the discounted postal rates, which placed them on the same
level as the major parties. 120
In both Buckley and Greenberg, the nonmajor parties' underlying
argument was that in an election campaign, money is the
equivalent of speech.' 21 Without sufficient financial support, the
ability of nonmajor parties to reach potential members is sharply
reduced.'22 Thus, the nonmajor parties argued that because money
is speech, and because the questioned legislation forced them to
spend more than the major parties,' 2 3 the nonmajor parties' right
to free speech was abrogated. 124 Unlike the Buckley Court, the
Greenberg court accepted the contention that money is speech.'
25
Thus, although the cases were similar, the Buckley and Greenberg
courts arrived at vastly different holdings. It is therefore arguable
that the later Greenberg holding signifies a changing focus.
One explanation of the apparent change in focus, however, is
the difference in fact situations. The major difference between the
cases, though, is that Buckley found no first amendment violation in
the public financing scheme.' 26 The Buckley Court held that the
public financing scheme actually facilitated, rather than inhibited,
speech.'27 The reasoning in Greenberg indicates no question that
115. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 11, 61, 102.
116. Id. at35, 84, 103-04.
117. 497 F. Supp. at 779.
118. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. at 102-03. The "new" political parties argued that forcing
them to seek loans based upon the likelihood that five percent of the vote cast would be in their favor
was an unconstitutional burden. Id.
119. 497 F. Supp. at 764, 784.
120. Id. at 784, 786.
121. Id. at 778. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 92-93.
122. 497 F. Supp. at 779. The court stated that interference with a political party's use of the
mails is a direct infringement on its ability to procure new members, and thus violates its first
amendment right of freedom of association. Id.
123. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 102. In Buckley minority parties spent more money because
they lacked sufficient support to qualify for pre-election campaign funds. Similarly, the plaintiff
parties in Greenberg paid 8.4 cents per letter while the major parties paid only 3.1 cents. 497 F. Supp.
at 764.
124. 497 F. Supp. at 778.
125. Id.
126. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 86.
127. Id. at 92-93. In Buckley the Court determined that public financing facilitated and enlarged




funds appropriated would be spent on mailings.1 28  In
Buckley, however, courts were uncertain as to how political parties
would ultimately spend public financing. 129 Although the amounts
of money involved in the cases differed, the right to free expression
was nevertheless involved. Thus, the basic constitutional question
remained the same in both Buckley and Greenberg. The Buckley Court,
however, evidenced a "relative lack of concern for the viability of
nonmajor party candidates" 130 and an "insensitivity to the burdens
placed [upon them] by the legislation.""' In contrast, the Greenberg
court carefully considered all ramifications of the legislation in
question. 13 2 The Greenberg court's focus on the vital role of
nonmajor parties in our democratic system indicates a willingness
to closely examine challenged legislation. Greenberg, when combined
with decisions such as Buckley, should strengthen the arguments of
future litigants who contest the regulation of political campaigns.
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128. 497 F. Supp. at 775.
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of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 323, 356 (1977).
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